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THE TWENTY-SECOND AMENDMENT: A 
PRACTICAL REMEDY OR PARTISAN 
MANEUVER? 
Stephen W. Stathis* 
At a Republican fund-raiser during his second term, President 
Ronald Reagan cast a wistful glance at a "Reagan 88" banner in the 
Dallas Apparel Mart. While flying to the scene of his 1984 Repub-
lican Convention triumph, he recalled, "I started asking myself, 'I 
wonder how folks down there would feel about giving it one more 
try?' " With a roar of approval from the crowd, the President ad-
ded, "I'm kidding, of course."' 
Standing in Reagan's way was the twenty-second amendment, 
which prohibits anyone from being elected president more than 
twice. Shortly thereafter a group of Reagan enthusiasts began a 
brief but high-spirited campaign to make it possible for him to run 
again. While the talk of a third term for Ronald Reagan may have 
been fantasy, the "Reagan 88" boomlet did give rise to a more seri-
ous development-a nascent movement to repeal the twenty-second 
amendment and a re-opening of debate over the amendment's 
merits. 
Even before it was ratified in 1951, the amendment was widely 
regarded as an attempt by vengeful Republicans to strike back at 
Franklin D. Roosevelt, the only president in American history to be 
elected to more than two terms.2 Ironically, the only two incum-
Stephen W. Stathis is a specialist in American National Government and Head of 
the Executive Branch Organization and Presidency Section, Congressional Research Service, 
Library of Congress. He wishes to express his appreciation to his colleagues Dr. Harold 
Relyea, Dr. James Sayler, and Barbara Schwemle for their generous help and suggestions in 
the preparation of this article. 
I. Remarks at a Fundraiser for Republican Gubernatorial Candidate William Cle-
ments, July 23, 1986. 22 WEEKLY COMPILATION OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS 981 (July 
28, 1986); Presidential Two-Term Limit Serves No Legitimate Purpose, Courier-]. (Louisville, 
Kentucky), Aug. 6, 1986 at AS. 
2. Louis W. Koenig has described the twenty-second amendment as "posthumous re-
venge against Franklin Roosevelt for breaking the two term tradition." L. KoENIG, THE 
CHIEF EXECUTIVE 70 (4th ed. 1981). Paul B. Davis also characterized the amendment as "a 
posthumous revenge against Franklin D. Roosevelt for breaking the two-term tradition." P. 
Davis, Presidential Tenure: A Review and Reappraisal 158 (1978) (unpublished Ph.D. dis-
sertation, University of Utah). 
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bent presidents thus far affected by the amendment have been 
Republicans-Dwight D. Eisenhower and Ronald Reagan-both of 
whom might well have been able to win third terms. 
Most people forget that twenty-eight of the forty-one men who 
have occupied the White House lived there less than two terms. 
The average length of their service has been five years and three 
months.3 Since the first half-century of the Republic, the one-term 
president has been the rule rather than the exception. During the 
past century and a half, only six Presidents have served two full 
elective terms and then retired. Within this context, "Franklin Del-
ano Roosevelt's three plus terms must be considered an anomaly."4 
Why then, given the failure of the majority of American presi-
dents to win even a second term, was a limit imposed on the number 
of terms to which a president might be elected? Did adoption of the 
twenty-second amendment fill a perceived need or represent a parti-
san maneuver? 
THE LONG DEBATE OVER PRESIDENTIAL TENURE 
In both 1940 and 1944, the Republican party platform called 
for a constitutional amendment to limit a president to two terms.s 
The Republicans, however, were unable to defeat the incumbent 
FDR at the polls. Then, in 1946, for the first time in almost two 
decades, they gained control of Congress. Only once during the 
next forty years would both Houses of Congress belong to the 
Republicans. 6 One of the Republicans' first priorities in 1946 was a 
constitutional amendment to prevent any future president from 
gaining a Roosevelt-type hold on the White House. The ensuing 
controversy renewed a debate which began in the Constitutional 
Convention of 1787 and in the subsequent state ratifying 
conventions. 
At the Constitutional Convention, the question of presidential 
tenure occupied extensive time and severely tried the patience of 
many of the Founding Fathers. 1 Congress began its own struggle 
with the question in 1803, when the first proposal to limit presiden-
3. Smith, The Third Term and the Dead Hand, 29 Sw. Soc. SCI. Q. 273, 274 (March 
1949); J.N. KANE, FACTS ABOUT THE PRESIDENTS 420-21 (4th ed. 1981). 
4. Bailey, Presidential Tenure and the Two-Term Tradition, 2 Pusuus 95, 105 (Fall 
1972). "Of the 25 Presidents between [James] Monroe and Franklin Roosevelt, covering well 
over 100 years, Andrew Jackson was the only one who presumably could have had a third 
term if he had wanted it." Smith, supra note 3, at 274. 
5. ) D. JOHNSON, NATIONAL PARTY PLATFORMS 394, 412 (1978). 
6. The only other time the Republicans controlled both Houses was during the Eighty-
Third Congress (1953-1955). 
7. Davis, supra note 2, at 12-38. 
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tial tenure was introduced.s The idea of changing the length of the 
presidential term appeared in 1808.9 Resolutions proposing a vari-
ety of limitations followed, seeking to gain approval for a single one, 
four, five, six, seven, and eight-year term.to In 1824 and again in 
1826, the Senate approved resolutions calling for a two-term limit, 
but they died in the House. At the outset of the Civil War, the 
Congress of the Confederate States of America adopted a constitu-
tion limiting the president of the Confederacy to a single six-year 
term. 
While Congress continued to examine the issue of presidential 
tenure, a quiet tradition was being established, one that would en-
dure for more than a century-and-a-half. In 1796, President George 
Washington's refusal to run for a third term "received such official 
sanction that it became an almost unwritten law, virtually as sacred 
as any provision of the Constitution." 11 Within a decade, Thomas 
Jefferson added his support to the two-term presidency by making it 
clear he would not be a candidate for a third term. Subsequent de-
cisions by James Madison, James Monroe, and Andrew Jackson not 
to seek a third term further promoted the two-term tradition.12 
Not until Ulysses S. Grant would another president serve two 
complete terms and be in a position to challenge the two-term limit. 
Shortly after President Grant's reelection to a second term in 1872, 
Republican newspapers began pushing the idea of his candidacy for 
a third term. While Grant refrained from commenting on the prop-
osition, a vigorous debate ensued. When the third term became a 
key issue in the 1874 midterm elections, "Grant's silence," at least 
8. This resolution provided: "That no person who has been twice successively elected 
President of the United States shall be eligible as President until four years shall have elapsed: 
but any citizen who has been President of the United States may, after such intervention, be 
eligible to the office of President for four years and no longer." It was rejected by a vote of 
twenty-five to four. 13 ANNALS OF THE CONG. OF THE UNITED STATES 214 (Dec. 12, 1803). 
9. This resolution, the only proposal to reduce the length of the presidential term, 
called for choosing the president by lot from retiring Senators. The term of office was to be 
fixed at one year. Hillhouse, Amendments to the Constitution, 17 ANNALS OF THE CONG. OF 
THE UNITED STATES 356-57 (April 12, 1808). 
10. For background on the various proposals see Davis, supra note 2, at 82-86; S. 
Stathis, Presidential Tenure: A History and Analysis of the President's Term of Office, CoNG. 
RES. SERV. REP. No. 81-129 GOV, 49-64, 87-94 (1981); Moves To Limit the Term, 26 CoNG. 
DIG. 14 (1947); and The Question of a Single Six-Year Presidential Term, 51 CONG. DIG. 71 
(1972). 
II. P. Davis, supra note 2, at 2. Davis points out that "(i]t is somewhat ironic that a 
man who never spoke against presidential reeligibility should be regarded as the symbol of 
the two-term tradition. There is certainly no argument that Washington refused to run (for] 
a third presidential term, but there is ample evidence that he never expected or desired his 
refusal to become a precedent for later Presidents." He suggests that it would be more 
"proper to consider Thomas Jefferson and not George Washington as the true founder ... of 
the two-term tradition." /d. at 43. 
12. /d. at 2, 47-49, 5!-52. 
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one author has concluded, "was largely instrumental in bringing 
about Republican defeat in New York, Ohio, and many other 
states."u Finally, the following spring, the Pennsylvania Republi-
can State Convention adopted a resolution expressing its "unalter-
able opposition" to the election of any president for a third term. 
Almost immediately, Grant assured the president of the Penn-
sylvania convention that he was not, nor had he "ever been, a candi-
date for a renomination. I would not accept a nomination if it were 
tendered," he wrote, "unless it should come under such circum-
stances as to make it an imperative duty-circumstances not likely 
to arise."I4 
Although with this correspondence the third term movement 
lost much of its impetus, there were still many Americans who 
wanted to see Grant reelected, and in subtle ways they continued to 
encourage his candidacy. The death blow came suddenly on De-
cember 15, 1875, when the House of Representatives, by a decisive 
vote of two hundred thirty-three to eighteen, passed a resolution 
stating that the "precedent established by Washington and other 
presidents of the United States, in retiring from the presidential of-
fice after their second term, has become, by universal concurrence, a 
part of our republican system of government." The resolution con-
tended that "any departure from this time honored custom would 
be unwise, unpatriotic, and fraught with peril to our free 
institutions." 1s 
Grant, however, was destined to make one more run for the 
presidency. At the 1880 Republican Convention in Chicago, he was 
the leading candidate for the nomination through thirty-five ballots. 
On the thirty-sixth ballot, the stop-Grant forces combined to nomi-
nate James A. Garfield.I6 
By the time the Eightieth Congress convened in 1946, more 
than two hundred attempts had been made to amend the Constitu-
tion and fix the tenure of the president. I? 
Had Franklin D. Roosevelt lost the 1940 election, his third bid 
would have been but another interesting episode in the history of 
13. C. STEIN, THE THIRD TERM TRADITION 76 (1943). See also, Davis, supra note 2, 
at 72-76. 
14. E. MCPHERSON, HANDBOOK OF POLITICS FOR 1876 155 (1876). A week later, a 
similar resolution was approved by the Ohio Republican State Convention. ld. at 227. 
15. H.R. Res., 44th Cong., 1st Sess., 4 CONG. REc. 228 (1875). The Senate adopted an 
identical resolution in 1928. S. Res. 118, 70th Cong., 1st Sess., 69 CoNG. REc. 2842 (1928). 
16. Thirty-two years later, Theodore Roosevelt achieved the distinction of seeking, 
though unsuccessfully, a third term. Davis, supra note 2, at 57-59, 64-65. 
17. See, e.g., Graham, Amendment to the Constitution Relating to the Terms of Office of 
the President, 93 CONG. REC. 847 (1947); Graham, Moves to Limit the Term, 1787-1947, 26 
CONG. DIG., 16 (1947). 
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the debate over presidential tenure. "Instead, his victory wrote the 
concluding chapter for the two-term custom, and, simultaneously, 
the opening chapter in the history of a successful drive to fasten a 
legal limit on presidential tenure into the Constitution."Is 
The third-term issue had little discernable effect on voters in 
the 1940 election, but it did generate widespread public interest dur-
ing the campaign. In September and October, immediately prior to 
the election, a special subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee devoted sixteen days of hearings on the propriety of a third 
term.I9 On November 3, Republican standard bearer Wendell 
Willkie announced that in his very first message to Congress he 
would call for a constitutional amendment limiting presidents to 
two terms.2o 
Between March 1940 and September 1943, in anticipation of 
Roosevelt's third and fourth campaigns, eight State legislatures 
passed resolutions calling for a limitation on presidential tenure.2I 
Gallup polls in April 1943, December 1943, April 1944, and July 
1944 indicated that a majority of those polled favored a law which 
would prohibit presidents from serving more than two terms.22 
"Widespread public interest in the third term issue," however, "ex-
isted only during the 1940 campaign." That concern was "tied to 
the outcome of the election rather than any fundamental princi-
ple."23 Republican attempts to revive the third-term issue again in 
1944 proved to be "decidedly anticlimactic and altogether a dismal 
failure." Finally, "realizing that the popular appeal of the issue was 
gone, the proponents of the amendment never again tried to arouse 
public sentiment behind them. "24 
Late in 1945, some five months after Roosevelt's death, a 
poorly attended one-hour Senate Judiciary Committee hearing on 
presidential tenure, largely ignored by the press, began the process 
leading to the 194 7 enactment of the twenty-second amendment. 
Informal hearings in the Senate and in the House failed to arouse 
18. F. Zucker, The Adoption of the Twenty-Second Amendment 5 (1958) (unpublished 
Ph.D. dissertation, Pennsylvania State University). 
19. Third Term for President of the United States: Hearings on S.J. Res. 15 and S.J. 
Res. 289 Before the Subcomm. of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 76th Con g., 3rd Sess. ( 1940). 
20. Hagerty, Wi/lkie Would Bar Jd Term by Law, N.Y. Times, Nov. 4, 1940, at I, col. 
10. 
21. For a discussion of the petitions, see Zucker, supra note 18, at 30-36. 
22. I G. GALLUP, THE GALLUP POLL: PUBLIC OPINION 1935-1971, at 381, 424, 422, 
452 (1972). A November 1944 National Opinion Research Center (NORC) poll showed that 
fifty-eight percent favored a constitutional amendment that would prohibit presidents from 
serving more than two terms. PUBLIC OPINION, 1935-1946 649 (H. Cantril & M. Strunk eds. 
1951). 
23. Davis, supra note 2, at 147. 
24. Zucker, supra note 18, at 120. 
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any interest whatsoever among those groups that normally would 
have been expected to testify. Even President Truman played a 
"strictly passive" role in opposing the amendmenvs 
"By the time the battle over presidential tenure was renewed," 
when the Eightieth Congress convened on January 3, 1947, "the 
intra-party differences were sharply defined. "26 From the outset the 
House Republican leadership sought to avoid public hearings that 
might possibly arouse latent opposition. They hoped to secure 
quick passage in the House so that the amendment could reach the 
State legislatures while they were still in session. At the same time, 
House Speaker Joseph Martin proved to be the inspirational leader 
as well as the sustaining force behind the movement.27 
Early that February, attention in the House focused on two 
proposals, one introduced by Everett Dirksen of Illinois to limit the 
president to a single six-year term, and a second offered by Earl 
Michener of Michigan limiting the president to two four-year terms. 
Only Michener's proposal received serious consideration. It was 
taken up by a House Judiciary subcommittee on February 3 and 
reported favorably to the full Committee later the same day. Be-
tween sixteen and eighteen Members of Congress reportedly made 
statements before the subcommittee.2s 
Two days later, Representative Michener's resolution was fa-
vorably reported by a majority of the full Committee. The heart of 
the stated Republican position was contained in the House Judici-
ary Committee's report, which declared: 
By reason of the lack of a positive expression [in the Constitution] upon the subject 
of tenure of the office of President, and by reason of a well-defined custom which 
has arisen in the past that no President should have more than two terms in that 
office, much public discussion has resulted upon this subject. Hence it is the pur-
pose of this legislation, if passed, to submit this question to the people so they, by 
and through the recognized processes, may express their views upon this question, 
and, if they shall elect, they may amend our Constitution and thereby set at rest this 
problem. 
This is not a political question. The importance of the problem to the people tran-
scends all political implications and considerations.29 
25. Jd. at 120, 126-29, 131. See also Davis, supra note 2, at 147-48, 163. In 1950, while 
the amendment was still being considered by the States, President Truman felt he "could be 
elected again and continue to break precedent as it was broken by F.D.R.," but felt "it should 
not be done. That precedent should continue not by Constitutional amendment, but by cus-
tom based on the honor of the man in office." 2 H. TRUMAN, MEMOIRS BY HARRY S. TRU-
MAN 489 (1956). 
26. P. Willis & G. Willis, The Politics of the Twenty-Second Amendment, 5 W. PoL. Q. 
469, 479 (1952). 
27. Zucker, supra note 18, at 118, 137-39. 
28. 93 Cong. Rec. 8634 (1947); see also Davis, supra note 2, at 95. 
29. H.R. REP No. 17, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1947). For a discussion of the minority 
views of the House Judiciary Committee report, see Willis, supra note 26, at 480-81. 
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During the emotion-filled debate of the following day, it 
quickly became evident that the three sets of minority views at-
tached to the Committee's report represented the opinions of a sig-
nificant number of Members. Several speakers favored a limitation 
of two four-year terms, while others felt any limitation was inappro-
priate, or wanted to limit future presidents to a single six-year 
term.Jo The Democrats charged that the amendment was "anti-
Roosevelt." There were repeated assertions during the debate that 
a two-term limitation would tie the hands of the American people, 
but when the vote was taken later that afternoon, the House ap-
proved the two-term limitation by a vote of 285 to 121. All 238 
Republican Members who voted supported the proposed amend-
ment. Bolstering the vote were 47 Democrats, 37 of whom were 
from southern states. Their defection gave the Republicans the 
two-thirds majority needed to ensure passage of the amendment.3' 
Action in the Senate was protracted. Although the Senate Ju-
diciary Committee enthusiastically supported the effort to give the 
American people a vote on the question of presidential tenure, its 
study of the issue had raised troubling concerns. 
"Simply because a man might hold office or act as President for 
a few days or months," the Committee felt, "he should not arbitrar-
ily be foreclosed from serving two further full terms of 4 years 
each." The House-passed version made any person ineligible for 
reelection to the presidency who had served any part of two terms, 
while the Senate Judiciary Committee proposal allowed a suc-
ceeding president to remain in office for up to nine years.32 
The Senate Judiciary Committee version also called for ratifi-
cation by State constitutional conventions rather than the State leg-
islatures, as provided in the House measure. The members of State 
legislatures, it was reasoned, "in many instances had no direct man-
date from their constituencies on which to base a vote for or against 
the measure." Despite the contention that a constitutional conven-
30. 93 CONG. REC. 841-72 (1947). Excellent summaries of the debate are found in 
Davis, supra note 2, at 95-101 and A. GRIMES, DEMOCRACY AND THE AMENDMENTS TO 
THE CONSTITUTION 116-19 {1978). 
31. Davis, supra note 2, at 114-15. Frederick Donald Zucker found that "37 southern 
representatives constituting 22.5 percent of House Democrats ... opposed their party's posi-
tion and voted in favor of the Republican-sponsored amendment." "The 37 southern con-
gressmen who voted against their party on the amendment collectively supported their party 
in 68.7 percent of all 194 7 party votes, while those 57 southerners who supported their party 
in the vote on the amendment supported their party in 81.5 percent of the votes." The House 
"Democrats who opposed their party [on the Twenty-Second Amendment] were those who 
most frequently supported majorities of Republicans against their own party." Zucker, supra 
note 18, at 149, 153. Alan P. Grimes mistakenly places the number of Democrats supporting 
the Amendment at fifty instead of forty-seven. A. GRIMES, supra note 30, at 119. 
32. S. Rep. No. 34, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-3 (1947). 
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tion provided the "only adequate and expeditious manner of regis-
tering the sentiment of the citizens directly,"33 the full Senate on 
March 10 overwhelmingly defeated the proposal. Only twenty Sen-
ators supported its adoption.34 
Resolution of other substantive concerns was essentially 
worked out during private conferences between Robert Taft, Mil-
lard Tydings and several other Senators, before being brought to the 
floor on March 12.35 Although several changes would be subse-
quently proposed during the ensuing debate later that day, the Taft-
Tydings compromise was enacted as the twenty-second amendment. 
In place of the original House resolution, which carried a limit 
of eight years in office, the Senate extended the limit to a possible 
ten years. A person who succeeded to the presidency and served 
less than two years, would be eligible to be elected president twice in 
his own right. An individual who served for more than two years of 
a predecessor's term would be eligible to be elected president only 
once. The Senate also exempted Truman from the proposed 
amendment. 
Thirteen Democrats joined forty-six Republicans in supporting 
the proposed amendment. All but four of the Democratic votes in 
the Senate came from southern states. Not one Republican in either 
House defected from the party position to vote against the 
measure.36 
The Senate returned its version of the amendment to the House 
on March 13.37 The House approved the Senate version of H.J. 
Res. 27 by an amazingly small vote of eighty-one to twenty-nine a 
week later. Objections to the vote on the grounds of an absence of a 
quorum were made and then withdrawn.3s 
WHY THE TWENTY SECOND AMENDMENT 
WAS ADOPTED 
House and Senate debate on the twenty-second amendment 
clearly indicates that party politics played a key role in its adoption. 
33. /d. at 2. The proposal was also supported by United States News. Safeguards on 
the Presidency, United States News, February 28, 1947, at 22-23. 
34. 93 CONG. REC. 1862 (1947). See also Davis, supra note 2, at 102-07. 
35. 93 CONG. REC. 1938-39 (194 7). Frederick Zucker credits Taft with being the driv-
ing force behind the Amendment's passage in the Senate. Zucker, supra note 18, at 138. To 
understand why Taft supported the amendment, see id. at 174-75. 
36. Davis, supra note 2, at 108-11, 114-15; A. GRIMES, supra note 30, at 120. Frederick 
Zucker found that the nine southern Senators who supported the amendment "collectively 
voted with a majority of their party against a majority of Republicans only on 57.8 percent of 
the rolls." Zucker, supra note 18, at 159. 
37. 93 CONG. REC. 1978 (1947). 
38. 93 CONG. REC. 2392 (1947). 
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The major impetus "for setting a two-term limit on the tenure of a 
president came from the Republicans, and the strongest opposition 
to it was offered by the Democrats who saw it [as] a slur on the 
memory of President Franklin D. Roosevelt." An examination of 
the most significant votes on the amendment, the two in committee 
and the two on the floor, clearly indicates "that a remarkable degree 
of unanimity was maintained by the Republicans on the issue, since 
not one Republican swayed from the party line." The success of the 
Republicans in maintaining "party unity and the failure of Demo-
crats to do so," at least one scholar argues, "appears to be the major 
factor in the deliberations on the twenty-second amendment in 
Congress." 39 
Although the impact of party unity cannot be denied, without 
the votes of thirty-seven southerners in the House and nine in the 
Senate, the Republicans would not have been able to attain the re-
quired two-thirds majority. "During the New Deal, Republicans 
and black-belt southerners formed a tight but relatively ineffective 
alliance against Roosevelt's economic policies." When President 
Roosevelt died, the "alliance expected a shift to the right," but in-
stead "Harry Truman continued his predecessor's liberal effort 'to 
improve the lot of the common people.' "40 By 1947, southern re-
sentment toward Truman's liberal economic reforms had grown 
even stronger and was a serious problem for the Democrats. "In 
most cases the opposing southerners were voting both in protest 
against what had gone on" under Roosevelt, "and to prevent its 
continuance in the future by reducing the leadership potentiality of 
the presidency." Had they known of Truman's forthcoming civil 
rights program, an even larger number of liberal southerners would 
have been driven "into the arms of the hard core that supported" 
the twenty-second amendment.41 
"Implicit in the Republicans' view was the belief that the 
twenty-second amendment would strengthen and safeguard democ-
racy from what they believed to be its greatest danger: the aggran-
dizement, consolidation, and even usurpation of political power by 
39. Davis, supra note 2, at 113-14; see also. id. at 124, 140, 146; Zucker, supra note 18, 
at 175. Reo M. Christenson argues that the notion that the passage of the twenty-second 
amendment "was largely motivated by partisan consideration is almost beyond challenge." 
R. CHRISTENSON, HERESIES RIGHT AND LEFT: SOME POLITICAL ASSUMPTIONS REEXAM· 
INED 139 (1973). Donald G. Morgan suggests that: "The Republicans, by enshrining the 
ban on the third term" in party platforms, by placing it at the head of their legislative pro-
gram, and presumably by making it a test of party loyalty, "fostered an atmosphere and 
frame of mind which stifled mature and patient deliberation on the merits of the proposal." 
D. MORGAN, CONGRESS AND THE CONSTITUTION 243 (1966). 
40. See Zucker, supra note 18, at 149-64, 168. 
41. /d. at 172. 
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the executive branch of government." For them, "the twenty-sec-
ond amendment was not an undemocratic restraint upon the popu-
lar will, but a democratic restraint upon any future, dangerously 
ambitious demagogue." 42 
The Democrats argued that the "two-term tradition had been 
broken, and wisely so, by Roosevelt because of the extraordinary 
emergency which arose with the second world war, in which the 
survival of the nation was at stake." A change in the presidency at 
such a time, they reasoned, would have been dangerous to the coun-
try. The American people agreed in both 1940 and 1944. "This 
was the democratic way of deciding the question." To prohibit the 
reelection of "an experienced and popular President in a time of 
extreme national emergency," the Democrats reasoned, would in-
vite rather than prevent dictatorship.43 
In late March 1947, the proposed twenty-second amendment 
was submitted to the States for ratification. Although the Republi-
can Party was destined not to duplicate its perfect record for party 
loyalty at the state level, the ratification vote was nevertheless re-
markable. Only twenty-five Republican state senators and fifty-
eight Republican state representatives, out of 3,272 Republican 
state legislators whose votes were recorded, deserted their party.44 
During the ensuing nine months, eighteen states ratified the 
amendment. Every one had sizeable Republican majorities in both 
houses of their legislatures. The two states (Texas and Oklahoma) 
that rejected the amendment in 1947 were controlled by Democrats. 
Although only a few state legislatures convened in 1948, a major 
breakthrough occurred when Virginia and Mississippi, two solid 
southern Democratic states, joined New York in approving the pro-
posed amendment.4s 
By February 27, 1951, the constitutionally-required thirty-six 
states, including seven southern Democratic states, had approved 
the new amendment. Four more southern Democratic states in-
creased the total to forty-one by May.46 
Those state legislators who supported the "amendment gener-
ally employed the arguments that it was designed to prevent dicta-
torship, and that it was nonpartisan in nature." Opponents 
contended that it was aimed "at the memory of Franklin D. 
Roosevelt," and the 1940 election "had already decided the issue." 
42. A. GRIMES, supra note 30, at 122. 
43. /d. 
44. Davis, supra note 2, at 125. For somewhat different figures see Zucker, supra note 
18, at 197. 
45. See Zucker, supra note 18, at 178, 184; Davis, supra note 2, at 130-34. 
46. See Zucker, supra note 18, at 179-80. 
1990] PRESIDENTIAL TERMS 71 
They felt the American people "should have the right to select any 
leader they felt capable of doing the job. As in Washington, the 
halls of the state capitols rang with copious quotations from famous 
figures of American history."47 
Several common issues linked Republican state legislators with 
their counterparts in Washington. First and foremost was the real-
ity that FDR's political coattails helped elect a sizeable number of 
Democrats at the state level. Also, many approved the amendment 
hoping it would discourage Harry Truman from running for 
reelection. 48 
Despite the similarities between debate on the amendment on 
Capitol Hill and in the state legislatures, there appears to have been 
no organized effort to secure ratification. Neither congressional 
leaders, the Republican National Committee, nor the Democratic 
National Committee became involved in the process once the 
amendment was sent to the states. President Truman likewise "re-
mained entirely aloof from the issue." Several governors, however, 
took prominent positions during the ratification process. "In only 
one case did a governor's stand fail to coincide with the decision of 
the legislature. "49 
The twenty-second amendment, according to the Nation, 
"glided through legislatures in a fog of silence-passed by men 
whose election in no way involved their stand on the question-
without hearings, without publicity, without any of that popular 
participation that should have accompanied a change in the organic 
law of the country."so The press and the public were equally lax. 
There was only spotty coverage in the local press, virtually none in 
national periodicals, and little public participation. Even interest 
groups most directly affected by the change in presidential tenure 
paid little attention to the ratification process.s1 
Except for states that desired to be the first or last to ratify the 
twenty-second amendment, there appears to be "no clearly defina-
ble reason for the state legislators to protect any specific state inter-
est outside the South."s2 Although popular support for FDR in the 
South was overwhelming, there were some unique pressures on 
southern legislators. 
During the first year the amendment was before the states, not 
one Southern state ratified it. That fall, however, Democratic soli-
47. /d. at 190. 
48. /d. at 198-99. 
49. /d. at 202-03. 
50. The Two-Term Limit, 172 NATION 216, 217 (1951). 
51. Zucker, supra note 18, at 122-26, 208, 229, 236-37. 
52. /d. at 229. 
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darity in the South began to crumble soon after President Truman's 
Committee on Civil Rights recommended that a broad program for 
the protection of the civil rights of minorities be implemented. 
Early in 1948, even before the Truman Administration had time to 
unveil its civil rights program, Virginia became the first Southern 
state to ratify the amendment. Soon after the President sent his 
special civil rights message to Congress on February 2, Governor 
Fielding L. Wright of Mississippi asked the Southern Governors' 
Conference to serve notice on Democratic Party leaders that they 
would no longer tolerate the repeated campaigns for enactment of 
civil rights legislation. Less than a week later, the Mississippi state 
legislature voted overwhelmingly for the ratification of the twenty-
second amendment. That March, the Southern Governors' Confer-
ence recommended that state Democratic conventions resolve not 
to vote for any candidate favoring civil rights and that delegates to 
the Democratic National Convention be instructed to oppose Tru-
man's nomination.s3 
In 1950, Louisiana became the third southern state to approve 
the two-term limit. Between February and May of 1951, the re-
maining eight states of the old Confederacy "ratified the amend-
ment as an expression of disapproval of Truman's program and to 
discourage any reelection ideas he might have been entertaining." 
Also, southerners "feared any change that even appeared to open 
the way to Federal intervention in the southern social system." The 
twenty-second amendment was seen as a viable way of suppressing 
what was "considered a threat to white supremacy in the South." 
Ratification of the amendment, "they hoped, would reduce the po-
tentialities for strong presidential leadership of civil rights drives for 
which the South was the obvious target."s4 It would also eliminate 
the "crusading Chief Executive in Washington who was dedicated 
to the cause of civil rights" and the destruction of their social 
system.ss 
SUBSEQUENT MISGIVINGS AND CONCERNS ABOUT 
THE AMENDMENT 
Following the ratification of the twenty-second amendment in 
1951, congressional interest in the question of presidential tenure 
lay virtually dormant for more than five years. Then in July 1956, 
during the waning moments of the Eighty-fourth Congress, two res-
olutions were introduced in the House calling for repeal of the 
53. /d. at 157. See also, id. at 154, 156-57. 
54. Zucker, supra note 18, at 230, 236, 239. 
55. Davis, supra note 2, at 158. 
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amendment,56 At a press conference on October 5, 1956, while 
Congress was in recess, President Eisenhower expressed his own 
misgivings regarding the amendment, arguing that the "United 
States ought to be able to choose for its President anybody that it 
wants, regardless of the number of terms he has served. "57 
Shortly after the Eighty-fifth Congress convened in January 
1957, five new resolutions were introduced to repeal the twenty-sec-
ond amendment. The expressed intent of at least one of the five 
resolutions,ss Senator Richard Neuberger stressed in a January 22 
floor statement, was to restore "to the American people the right to 
continue Dwight Eisenhower in office" after the termination of his 
second term in 1960. "The idea of imposing a constitutional limit 
of two terms on the Presidency," Neuberger argued, "was con-
ceived primarily by the political opponents of the only President in 
our history who, in a supreme national crisis, was elected to more 
than two terms."s9 Senator Neuberger's hopes were quickly 
squelched when president Eisenhower, at a January 1957 news con-
ference, formally renounced any intention of seeking a third term, 
even if the twenty-second amendment were repea1ed.60 
Representative Stewart Udall readily conceded that there was 
little likelihood of a repeal movement being successful, but he felt 
there were ample reasons for such a course of action. To assist his 
House colleagues "in reappraising the wisdom of the amendment," 
Udall, with the help of the American Historical Association and the 
American Political Science Association, surveyed more than thirty 
of the nation's leading historians and political scientists on the 
question.6I 
Of the twenty-nine scholars who responded to Udall's survey, 
twenty-four favored immediate repeal of the twenty-second amend-
ment. Only five considered repeal inappropriate at that time. 
While political scientist Carl Swisher of Johns Hopkins University 
viewed the twenty-second amendment as a mistake, he doubted the 
"advisability of repealing the amendment without very careful con-
sideration." Repeal, Swisher felt, "would do more than obliterate 
56. H.R.J. Res. 694, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., 102 CoNG. REc. 13784 (1956); H.R.J. Res. 
701, 89th Cong. 2d Sess., 102 CONG. REC. 15297 (1956). 
57. President's News Conference of Oct. 5, 1956, PUB. PAPERS: DWIGHT D. EISEN-
HOWER 850, 862 (1956). 
58. S.J. Res. 37, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., 103 Cong. Rec. 822 (1957). 
59. 103 Cong. Rec. 825 (1957) (statement by Sen. Neuberger). 
60. President's News Conference of January 30, 1957, PUB. PAPERS: DWIGHT D. EI-
SENHOWER 97, 106 (1957); President Bars a 3d-Term Race Even If 'They Repeal' Ban on It, 
N.Y. Times, January 31, 1957, at 14. 
61. 103 CONG. REC. 843 (1957) (statement of Rep. Udall). See also, Trussell, Bills Ask 
Repeal of the 3d Term Ban, N.Y. Times, January 23, 1957, at 14. 
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the amendment itself. It would revitalize what remains of the tradi-
tion against service for more than two consecutive terms and carry 
with it an implication of approval of continued reelection of 'indis-
pensable' presidents-an approval that ought to be given under 
most unusual circumstances."62 
Historian Arthur Link, as well as political scientists Arthur 
Holcombe, and Frank Prescott, also had serious misgivings about 
the amendment, but like Swisher, saw no need for its immediate 
repeal. Dr. Holcombe told Representative Udall he feared "that it 
[was] impossible to arouse enough interest" to repeal the amend-
ment "without arousing an amount of interest that would throw the 
question into politics." There were, in his opinion, far "more prom-
ising and more urgent subjects for consideration by thoughtful Con-
gressmen with a taste for constitutional reform."63 
Professor Link believed we would "be a very poor democracy, 
indeed, if we ever reach the stage where any single man is indispen-
sable beyond two terms of the Presidency."64 Dr. Prescott saw "no 
reason to rush into a repeal before we have the benefit of a few more 
years experience with the limitation. "6s 
By far the most comprehensive defense of the twenty-second 
amendment was offered by Thomas Barclay, professor of political 
science at Stanford University. He argued that the amendment had 
not been in operation long enough "to supply conclusive evidence of 
either the necessity or desirability of repealing it." Even more im-
portant were the political realities of the presidency that, in his 
opinion, supported the notion that two terms were enough. For Dr. 
Barclay, the two-term limit constituted "an effective check on pro-
longed power."66 
The remaining twenty-four presidential scholars who re-
sponded to the Udall survey issued a resounding call for the repeal 
of the twenty-second amendment, but their appeal had no apprecia-
ble impact. Neither the Senate nor the House took any action on 
repeal proposals during the Eighty-fifth Congress. 
During 1959, the movement to repeal the twenty-second 
amendment captured widespread public attention during Senate 
and House hearings. Supporters of repeal were bolstered by the 
personal endorsement of former President Truman in a telegram to 
a House Judiciary subcommittee in early February, and by his sub-
62. 103 CONG. REC. 4322 (1957); 103 CONG. REC. app., A3555. 
63. 103 CONG. REC. app., A3075 (1957). 
64. 103 CONG. REC. app., A2686 (1957). 
65. 103 CONG. REC. app., A3116 (1957). 
66. 103 CONG. REC. app., A4484 (1957). 
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sequent testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee's Consti-
tutional Amendment Subcommittee on May 4.67 In addition, 
President Eisenhower, during press conferences on January 21 and 
February 10, reiterated his belief that although there were good ar-
guments both for and against the two-term limitation, he personally 
did not believe it was a particularly nice amendment.6s 
Truman told the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Constitu-
tional Amendments that the twenty-second amendment was a "bad 
amendment and it ought to be repealed." When Congress was per-
suaded to approve it in 1947, Truman was convinced, it let itself be 
"sold ... a bill of goods" by the "Roosevelt haters." "What they 
actually accomplished," he believed, "was to make a 'lame duck' 
out of every second term President for all time in the future." Tru-
man continued by suggesting that "[y ]ou do not have to be very 
smart to know that an officeholder who is not eligible for reelection 
loses a lot of influence." If a man is not a good president, then "you 
do not have to reelect him." That is the "way to get rid of him and 
it does not require a constitutional amendment to do it. "69 
Enthusiasm over Truman's endorsement was short-lived. The 
following day, President Eisenhower publicly recanted his earlier 
misgivings regarding the amendment and spoke out in favor of it. 
A week later, the President once again supported the amendment 
when, in response to a question from a New York Times correspon-
dent, he told reporters that the Constitution was "something that 
ought to be amended only after careful thought, not with any pur-
pose in mind except that of what over the years and over the long 
term [was,] good for the United States. So, as of now," he con-
cluded, "I would say, let's let it lay on the shelf for a while and see 
how it works. "7o 
Supporters of repeal were further jolted on July 26, when the 
Senate Constitutional Amendments Subcommittee released a letter 
from Attorney General William Rogers expressing his opposition to 
the repeal on the grounds that the two-term ban had not yet had a 
67. Presidential Terms of Office: Hearings on S.J. Res. II Before the Subsomm. on Con-
stitutional Amendments of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 5-13 
(1959) (statement of Harry S. Ofruman). 
68. President's News Conferences of January 21, 1959 and February 10, 1959, Pus. PA-
PERS: DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER 130, 176 (1959). In memoirs Eisenhower wrote that he 
"originally thought the Twenty-second Amendment was unwise; but long before I left the 
Presidency I publicly stated that I had changed my mind and had come to believe, on bal-
ance, that the amendment was good for the nation." D. EISENHOWER, THE WHITE HousE 
YEARS: WAGING PEACE 1956-1961, 643 (1965). 
69. Truman, supra note 67, at 5-7. 
70. President's News Conferences of May 5, 1959 and May 13. 1959, Pus. PAPERS: 
DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER, 362-376, 387 (1959). 
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fair test.7t 
The Subcommittee finally approved a resolution to repeal the 
twenty-second amendment on September 1, 1959, but no further 
action was taken. n Similar proposals were to be introduced for the 
next three Congresses, each having the same fate. 73 
Although Eisenhower was not eligible for a third term as presi-
dent in 1960, in jest he raised the intriguing possibility that he just 
might run for vice president. When asked during a press conference 
on January 13 whether he was ready to support Vice President 
Nixon officially as his choice for the Republican nomination, Ike 
responded with a quip. "You know," he told William Knighton of 
the Baltimore Sun, "the only thing I know about the Presidency the 
next time is this: I can't run. [Laughter] But someone has raised 
the question that were I invited, could I constitutionally run for 
Vice President, and you might find out about that one. 
[Laughter]"74 
Eisenhower's comment sent students of the presidency scurry-
ing to see what would happen if he actually became Vice President, 
and his running mate died or resigned. Could he then become pres-
ident and serve what would be equivalent to a third term? Syndi-
cated columnist George Dixon took the question to Senator 
Thomas C. Hennings Jr. of Missouri, whom he regarded as the 
"outstanding authority in Congress on Constitutional Law." Sena-
tor Hennings concluded that "Ike not only [could] run for the Vice 
Presidency but [could] also inherit the Presidency." Dixon also 
asked former Secretary of State Dean Acheson if he thought it 
would be unconstitutional for Ike to run for Veep. After weighing 
the question, Mr. Acheson replied "that he thought it was more 
unlikely than unconstitutional." When Justice William J. Brennan, 
Jr. was asked about the matter, he "shied away from the 
question. " 75 
At the President's next press conference two weeks later, Mr. 
Knighton reminded Eisenhower of his suggestion that the White 
House press corps "get an opinion on whether a second term Presi-
dent should run for Vice President." "Not 'should,' the President 
responded, "I said 'could.'" Immediately Knighton corrected him-
71. Third-Term Amendment, 17 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 1029 (July, 1959). 
72. Senate Unit Backs Two-Term Repeal, N.Y. Times, September 2, 1959, at 32. 
73. A review of the CoNGRESSIONAL RECORD indicates that joint resolutions to repeal 
the twenty-second amendment were introduced in the Eighty-Seventh to Eighty-Ninth Con-
gresses (1961-1966). 
74. The President's News Conference of January 13, 1960, PUB. PAPERS: DWIGHT D. 
EISENHOWER 21, 23 (1960-61 ). 
75. Dixon, Ike's Right to V.P. Spot, Washington Post, January 21, 1960, at A-23. 
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self, and then asked Ike if he had received an "official opinion" on 
the question, and if he could run, would he? 
"I'll tell you this much," the President responded, "I'll be 
more like these non-running candidates; I'll be cagey-the after-
noon of that press conference, there was a note on my desk saying a 
report from the Justice Department-! don't know whether the At-
torney General himself signed this, but the report was, it was abso-
lutely legal for me to do so. That stopped it right there, as far as 
I'm concerned. "76 President Eisenhower never brought up the sub-
ject again. Others, however, continued to discuss the question until 
well into the summer. 11 
That August, former President Herbert Hoover came out in 
favor of the twenty-second amendment and emphasized that "eight 
years in the White House was enough exhaustion for any mortal. "7s 
The following May, four months after seeing his successor 
John F. Kennedy sworn in as the nation's thirty-fifth president, Ei-
senhower admitted that the thought of pursuing a third term had 
crossed his mind during the previous few weeks. Without hesita-
tion, the former President indicated that he might have sought a 
third term if the Constitution had permitted and he could have fore-
seen Richard Nixon's defeat.79 
When asked during a December 1962 television and radio in-
terview whether he would repeat his vote as a "young Congress-
man" to limit presidents to two terms, President Kennedy told 
William H. Lawrence of ABC: "Yes I would. I know the condi-
tions were special in '47, but eight years is enough, and I am not 
sure that a President, in my case if I were reelected, that you are at 
such a disadvantage." Kennedy felt "there [were] many powers of 
the Presidency that run in the second term as well as the first. "so 
For the next several years, proposals to modify presidential 
tenure focused on a single six-year term. The next serious effort to 
repeal the twenty-second amendment came only a few short months 
after Richard Nixon's overwhelming reelection victory of 1972. 
The following March, Projects for Peace, Inc., a New York adver-
76. The President's News Conference of January 26, 1960, Pus. PAPERS: DwiGHT D. 
EISENHOWER 133 (1960-61). 
77. Shapiro, V.P. Eisenhower?, N.Y. TIMES MAG., July 17, 1960, at 4; Vote for Eisen-
hower, N.Y. Times, July 22, 1960, at 8; Nadelman, 12 Plus 22, N.Y. TIMES MAG., July 31, 
1960, at 41. 
78. Bigart, Hoover, 86 Today, Scores Bigotry in Voting, N.Y. Times, August 10, 1960, at 
21. 
79. Eisenhower Says He'll Speak Out on Issues Confronting the Nation, N.Y. Times, 
May 9, 1961, at I. 
80. Television and Radio Interview: "After Two Years-A Conversation with the Presi-
dent," December 17, 1962, PUB. PAPERS: JOHN f. KENNEDY 892 (1962). 
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tising agency, was retained by a nonpartisan voters group, "Citizens 
for Nixon '76," to begin a campaign aimed at repealing the amend-
ment.8t On July 5, 1973, "Citizens for Nixon '76" kicked off its 
campaign at the Overseas Press Club in New York. The movement 
quickly fell apart a few weeks later when the disclosures of Water-
gate began to engulf the White House. 82 Meanwhile, congressional 
reformers had again shifted their attention, as they had so often 
before, to limiting presidents to a single six-year term. 
A decade later, President Ronald Reagan revived the idea of 
repeal during a September 1985 meeting with about a dozen mem-
bers of the American Legislative Exchange Council, an organiza-
tion of conservative legislators. The President told the group it was 
"ridiculous" to limit presidents to two terms if the American people 
wanted them to serve longer. The American people, he argued, 
"ought to have a right to decide who their leadership would be."83 
Subsequently, during a December 1985 interview, First Lady 
Nancy Reagan echoed her husband's enthusiasm for the proposal, 
but emphasized that a third term is "not for us. "84 
"No President can ever come out" in favor of repealing the 
twenty-second amendment "with himself in mind," President Rea-
gan emphasized in an interview the following February with Lou 
Cannon and David Hoffman of the Washington Post. Mr. Reagan 
did think, however, "that we ought to take a serious look and see if 
we haven't interfered with the democratic rights of the people."8s 
While none of the previous repeal efforts had aroused a great 
deal of support, either on Capitol Hill or among voters, President 
Reagan's backing stimulated considerable enthusiasm among Re-
publican partisans. 
Despite President Reagan's repeated pronouncements that he 
sought the repeal only for future presidents, not for himself, Repre-
sentative Guy Vander Jagt of Michigan, chairman of the National 
Republican Congressional Committee, was not easily deterred. In a 
July 1986 fund-raising letter to 300,000 GOP faithful, Rep. Vander 
Jagt enclosed an "Official Constitutional Petition" calling "for the 
immediate repeal of the 22nd Amendment which limits a president 
81. Four More Years More?, NEWSWEEK, March 5, 1973, at 20; Davis, The Future of 
Pres. Tenure, 10 PRES. STUDIES Q. 472 (Summer 1980). 
82. Davis, The Results and Implications of the Enactment of the Twenty-Second Amend-
ment, 9 PRES. STUDIES Q. 289, 301 (Summer 1979). 
83. Reagan Favors Repeal of Ban on Third Term. N.Y. Times, September 15, 1985, at 
33. 
84. Thomas, First Lady Favors Lifting Two-Term Limit for Presidents, Washington 
Post, December 12, 1985, at F4. 
85. Foreign and Domestic Issues Interview with Lou Cannon and David Hoffman of the 
Washington Post. February /0, 1986, 22 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 20 (February 17, 1986). 
1990] PRESIDENTIAL TERMS 79 
to only two terms." There were, he explained "a number of excep-
tionally well-qualified Republican presidential candidates ... [b ]ut 
why shouldn't we hold on to the 'original' as long as possible?" If 
enough petitions were received, Rep. Vander Jagt promised to 'per-
sonally introduce the legislation to repeal the 22nd Amendment."86 
On July 28, Rep. Vander Jagt formalized his offer with the in-
troduction of a joint resolution calling for the amendment's repeal. 
During the next three weeks, he was able to gamer sixty-five cos-
ponsors for H.J. Res. 687.87 On August 7 he told a cheering crowd 
of two hundred supporters gathered in Lafayette Park, "We are col-
lectively sending a message to the man across the street in the White 
House ... We're telling him, 'Get ready, Mr. President, for four 
more years.' " "When Ronald Reagan raises his hand to take the 
oath of office for the third time, history will record that it all began 
right here today in Lafayette Park. "88 
The following Monday evening, Charles Gibson anchored a 
segment of ABC News' "Nightline" devoted to the twenty-second 
amendment. Gibson's guests included Rep. Vander Jagt, Washing-
ton Post columnist Mark Shields, and political scientist Thomas 
Cronin. In Mark Shields' opinion, the amendment was "an act of 
posthumous vengeance upon the memory of a man [the Republi-
cans] couldn't beat in life, so they decided to get even with him in 
death." Rep. Vander Jagt readily conceded the "Republicans made 
a mistake" in 1947, and they now want "to correct that mistake." 
Also, "[w]e want Ronald Reagan to run again .... If you had the 
greatest all-time standard bearer and a chance to have him on the 
ballot" a third time, "of course politically you [would] want him 
again. "89 Professor Cronin agreed that the amendment had been 
"passed for the wrong reasons" and "does limit, to some extent, the 
choice of the American voter." Still, he argued, it has "several vir-
tues" which "ought to be debated and taken a little more seriously." 
He felt it created "a liveliness in the two political parties to nurture, 
recruit and to look for good candidates in the future." The Ameri-
86. Schwartz, Four More Years?, Washington Post, July 20, 1986, at A9. For specific 
mention of the 300,000 fund raising letters, see Schafly, Lets Not Repeal 22nd Amendment, 
Washington Times, August 22, 1986, at 3D; and Promoting Reagan for a Third Term, N.Y. 
Times, July 22, 1986, at Al6. 
87. H.R.J. Res. 687, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., 132 Cong. Rec. H4960 (1986); 132 Cong. 
Rec. H6297 (1986). For the reaction of the lone Democrat to co-sponsor the proposal, see 
Coelho, A Democrat Backs Repeal of the Two Term Limit, Christian Science Monitor, Aug. 
13, 1986 at Al4; Coelho, Petrified Without Reagan, Washington Post, August 12, 1986, at 
Al6. 
88. Grove, Terms of Endearment: Reagan Zealots Rally for Four More Years, Wash-
ington Post, August 8, 1986, at C I. 
89. Nightline: 22nd Amendment (ABC television broadcast, August II, 1986) (tran-
script on file at Library of Congress). 
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can people, the polls show, may well favor the twenty-second 
amendment, Cronin further explained, "because of the fact that we 
want [a] strong presidency but we don't want to see the abuse of 
power in such a terribly powerful office. "90 
Others viewed the repeal effort somewhat differently. "Con-
ceptually," Democratic National Committee chairman Paul Kirk 
Jr. had no objection to the proposal. Kirk, however, saw the Re-
publican effort as a "smokescreen" since the real reason it had been 
made was because Reagan was "all Republicans have to go on." 
Senate Majority Leader Robert Dole of Kansas doubted that Con-
gress "would repeal the 22nd Amendment in time" for Reagan to 
seek reelection, but felt the repeal campaign was "a great fund-rais-
ing idea."91 For the Los Angeles Times, the purpose of the cam-
paign was also clear. "Given the President's firm declaration on the 
matter-and Democratic control of the U.S. House and sufficient 
state legislatures-one can assume that Vander Jagt's drive is a 
fund-raising gimmick."92 Similarly, the Washington Post character-
ized the movement as an effort to "bamboozle potential contribu-
tors into thinking that they're trying to change the Constitution so 
that Mr. Reagan could seek a third term in 1988."93 
While much of the press viewed repeal as a good idea, most 
were skeptical about the campaign to win Reagan a third term. A 
sizeable number of the Naticn's newspapers agreed with the Los 
Angeles Times and Washington Post that the whole effort was little 
more than a GOP fund-raising gimmick.94 Newsweek conversely 
felt the President's "public flirtation with the issue [was] deliber-
ately designed to delay the inevitable movement when he [became], 
90. /d. at 5-6. In 1987, Cronin characterized the twenty-second amendment as "one of 
our least important amendments." Still, he goes on to argue that "its repeal could cause more 
harm than good, and it could send the wrong signals. It would for example, affirm positively 
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presidency in a century when this has already taken place in nearly every decade-usually at 
the expense of countervailing checks and balances." As a consequence, "until a better 
amendment is devised, it is better to retain it." Cronin, Two Cheers for the 22nd Amendment, 
Christian Science Monitor, February 23, 1987, at Al6. Ironically, a year later, Mr. Cronin 
wrote that "it was profoundly anti-democratic and undesirable to limit the discretion of the 
voters to choose who will rule them or represent them. . . . Imposing a restriction on the 
freedom to reelect a president is to violate an essential principle of democracy, namely the 
voters have the right to exercise a free and uncensored ballot." Cronin, Pro/Con: A Single 
Six-Year Term, 18 THIS CONSTITUTION 75 (Spring-Summer 1988). 
91. Benesch, Top Democrat Dismisses Republicans' Third-Term Dream, Washington 
Post, August I, 1986, at Al2. 
92. Worm in the Constitution, L.A. Times, August I, 1986, § 2, at 4. 
93. On the Hustings, Washington Post, July 28, 1986, at AIO. 
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once and for all, a lame duck."95 Despite Reagan's immense popu-
larity, an August 1986 Newsweek poll showed that sixty-two per-
cent of the voters interviewed did not want him to have a third 
term. Sixty percent opposed repeal of the twenty-second 
amendment. 96 
During the next few weeks, widespread criticism of the Presi-
dent's performance at the Iceland Summit, the devastating results 
of the 1986 mid-term elections, and the revelations of the Iran-Con-
tra scandal brought an abrupt end to any prospect of repeal. Mr. 
Reagan continued to speak out in favor of repeal, but public sup-
port declined sharply. Thirty-three percent of those surveyed for an 
October 1986 Gallup Poll said that they w0uld like to see the 
twenty-second amendment repealed.97 By the spring of 1988, only 
thirteen percent of those responding to a Media General! Associ-
ated Press national poll favored having a president serve more than 
two four-year terms.9s 
Although support for the President's effort waned appreciably, 
there continued to be considerable enthusiasm for Ronald Reagan 
as a candidate. More than thirty percent of poll respondents 
(thirty-nine percent in 1986 and thirty-two percent in 1988) indi-
cated that if the twenty-second amendment was repealed they 
would like to see President Reagan as a candidate in 1988 even 
though he would be eighty-one at the end of his third term. 
THE AMENDMENT'S IMPACT 
When the twenty-second amendment was debated in 1947, 
Henry Steele Commanger wrote that "there is one principle that is 
inescapably involved in [the] question of limited tenure and that is 
the principle of democracy." Limiting presidents to two terms was 
in Commanger's opinion a "vote of no confidence in democracy."99 
Four years later, just prior to ratification, former Secretary of the 
Interior Harold Ickes warned that the amendment was "a sinister 
plot on the part of the anti-social agencies to frighten [the American 
people] into mutilating their own precious democracy to the advan-
tage of those who have always exploited the people and always 
95. Morganthau, Four More Years?, NEWSWEEK, September 8, 1986, at 17. 
96. /d. at 16. 
97. Molotsky, Reagan Wants End of Two-Term Limit, N.Y. Times, November 29, 
1987, at 31; and G. GALLUP, THE GALLUP POLL: PUBLIC OPINION 1986, 217-220 (1987). 
98. Media General/ Associated Press National Poll, April-May 1988, at I. 
99. Commanger, Only Two Terms for a President?, N.Y. TIMES MAG., April 27, 1947, 
at 13. 
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Will."IOO 
"Aside from its allegedly undemocratic aspects," it has been 
suggested that the twenty-second amendment is quite unique among 
twentieth century constitutional modifications. Other amendments 
have been designed "to increase public control over" the election of 
Federal officials (seventeenth, nineteenth, twenty-third, twenty-
fourth, twenty-sixth amendments) "or to enhance the scope and 
power of the central government (sixteenth amendment)." The 
twenty-second amendment does neither. Instead, it "narrows the 
scope of the electoral choice of the people by putting a limit on the 
number of times they may vote for the same chief executive."101 
Despite this historical paradox and the apprehensions of Mr. 
Commanger and Mr. Ickes, public opinion polls during the past 
half-century repeatedly have shown that a majority of Americans 
favored a two-term limit.wz Still, FDR was reelected a fourth time 
in 1944, and approximately six out of ten Americans expressed a 
willingness fifteen years later to elect Eisenhower "if he could run 
for a third term." 103 
After more than three decades, the impact of the twenty-sec-
ond amendment on the Eisenhower presidency is still unclear. 
Some say that it hurt Ike. Others say it had no effect. President 
Eisenhower himself seemed unsure.I04 There will undoubtedly be 
equally diverse views regarding how it might have constrained Ron-
ald Reagan's final four years in the White House. 
Popular Support. Both men were extremely popular presi-
dents. In March 1959, George Gallup found that only one out of 
three Americans (thirty-four percent) favored repeal of the twenty-
second amendment, but fifty-eight percent indicated that if Dwight 
Eisenhower could run against Adlai Stevenson a third time, they 
100. Ickes, Twenty-second Amendment Lags, THE NEW REPUBLIC, January 29, 1951, at 
18. 
101. Sigel & Butler, The Public and the No Third Term Tradition: Inquiry Into Attitudes 
Toward Power, 8 MIDWEST J. OF POL. SCI. 40-41 (Feb. 1964). 
102. See. e.g .. G. GALLUP, THE GALLUP POLL: PUBLIC OPINION 1935-1971, v. I, at 25-
26 (1936), at 381,424 (1943), at 442,452 (1944); v. 2, at 1460 (1956); v. 3, at 1596 (1959); and 
G. GALLUP, THE GALLUP POLL: PUBLIC OPINION 1986, 216-20 (1987). The lone exception 
was a September 18, 1938, Gallup poll which found that fifty-two percent did not "favor a 
constitutional amendment prohibiting any President of the United States from serving a third 
term." I G. GALLUP, THE GALLUP POLL: PUBLIC OPINION 1935-1971, at 119. Interest-
ingly, sixty-nine percent of those polled for an August 17, 1938 poll said that they did not 
want Franklin D. Roosevelt to run for a third term, and sixty percent said that they would 
not vote for him if he did. /d. at 115. By December 1938, those opposed to Roosevelt seek-
ing a third term had risen to seventy percent, /d. at 129. 
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would vote for him. 105 
Three decades later, Ronald Reagan left office enjoying more 
popularity than when he entered it. He was elected in 1980 with 
fifty-one percent of the vote. In January 1989, his approval rating 
had risen to sixty-eight percent, "the highest given to any president 
at the end of his term since World War II." None of Mr. Reagan's 
predecessors during the previous four decades, according to the 
New York Times, "ever reached a sixty percent approval rating at 
the end of their tenure. Mr. Eisenhower had the next highest score, 
fifty-nine percent, and Mr. Nixon, who resigned under threat of im-
peachment, had the lowest, twenty-four percent."l06 What distin-
guished Ronald Reagan from other second-term presidents was "his 
administration's superior management of political communications 
and its exploitation of the symbolic properties of the presidency. 
Particularly striking (prior to the Iran-contra affair) was Reagan's 
ability to remain untarred when things went badly." Few if any 
"presidents could have escaped unscathed, as Reagan did, from the 
debris of the summit meeting with Soviet Premier Mikhail 
Gorbachev in 1986."107 
Legislative Impact. On Capitol Hill, Eisenhower and Reagan 
enjoyed their greatest successes with Congress during their first year 
in office. Eisenhower won eighty-nine percent of the roll-call votes 
on issues for which he had staked out a position. Reagan was victo-
rious eighty-two percent of the time. "Each bottomed out during 
their seventh year," and then recovered slightly before leaving the 
White House. Both had lost partisan control of Congress by then. 
President Reagan during his final year in office "arrested the steady, 
downhill slide of his fortunes on Capitol Hill. But doing better 
wasn't the same as doing well. For the second year in a row, Rea-
gan lost more roll-call votes than he won." In 1988, he prevailed on 
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percent of those polled in a Time Magazine/CNN survey in mid-January 1989, indicated 
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forty-seven percent of the roll-call votes on which he took a stand, 
up from forty-three percent the previous year. 10s President Eisen-
hower conversely registered successful roll-call percentage rates of 
fifty-two and sixty-five during his final two years in the Oval Of-
fice.I09 Ironically, "[w]ith all the hoopla of Reagan's success as 
president, in every single year his success scores were lower than 
Eisenhower's."! 10 
The Democrats, in control of both the House and Senate in 
1959-60 and in 1987-88, played offense; Reagan and Eisenhower 
played defense. They lacked the troops to take the offensive. "De-
spite public support scores in the mid-to high-sixties" early in his 
second term, Reagan was, one writer has suggested, "a notably less 
politically potent President ... than he was during his initial year in 
office. The significant difference, of course, was that by virtue of the 
twenty-second amendment, Reagan was not eligible for reelection." 
What this suggests, is "that unless public support is convertible into 
electoral clout for the president and those who support him, it be-
comes significantly less effective as a political resource." 111 
Role of Party Leader. Although the reelection of a president 
might be expected to inaugurate a period of accomplishment equal 
to his success at the polls, exactly the opposite has most often oc-
curred. Every president in the twentieth century has found his sec-
ond term more difficult than the first. There are several reasons for 
this phenomenon. 
Reelection campaigns are most often designed as a referendum 
on the President's first term rather than on his promises for the 
future. The financial and organizational needs of the party's other 
candidates become secondary. "Although such a strategy probably 
increases the President's margin of victory, it also contributes to his 
governing problems in the second term by making it easier for ad-
versaries to separate opposition to his program from opposition to 
him."II2 
Following the election, the result is a stalled agenda presided 
over by an incumbent president who has distanced himself from his 
party and lost the chance to establish useful and important bonds 
that will help him govern during his second term. Still, during "a 
President's fifth and sixth years-as in his third-there is considera-
108. Alston, Reagan's Support Index Up-But Not Much, 46 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 
3323-24 (November, 1988). 
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ble maneuvering room to shape events."II3 Then the two-term tra-
dition, which was formalized by the twenty-second amendment, 
operates decisively to weaken his influence. The midterm elections 
of a second term signal the beginning of the end. 
In the twentieth century, only "Theodore Roosevelt had more 
members of his own party in either the House or Senate when he 
left office than when he entered, and his case is a historical fluke, 
because both Houses were enlarged during his second term." II 4 
Despite Reagan's sustained personal appeal for voters to continue 
Republican control of the Senate in 1986, the Democrats easily 
gained eight seats in the Senate, while maintaining a comfortable 
majority in the House of Representatives. "Mr. Reagan was very 
much like Mr. Eisenhower in his tremendous personal popularity, 
as well as in his inability to use that popularity to promote the Re-
publican party." 11s 
Increased Emphasis on Foreign Policy. As their personal popu-
larity dropped midway through the second term, Reagan and Eisen-
hower found it increasingly more difficult to build a majority on 
domestic issues. Potential supporters demanded a larger reward for 
their support and opponents became more effective. 
Both Eisenhower and Reagan, however, maintained enormous 
influence in foreign affairs and to bear the major responsibility for 
international relations. They were able to retain the nation's atten-
tion by placing greater emphasis on foreign relations through sum-
mit conferences, by traveling abroad, and by hosting foreign 
dignitaries. 
In his first term, Dwight Eisenhower visited five foreign na-
tions, spent a total of eighteen days abroad, and hosted fifty heads of 
state or heads of governments. Thirty-eight percent of his nation-
ally televised addresses to the country focused on foreign affairs. 
During his final four years in office, these figures increased dramati-
cally as Ike spent seventy-three days in twenty-nine different coun-
tries, devoted sixty percent of his nationwide speeches to foreign 
affairs, and was visited by sixty-eight foreign leaders.II6 
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Although Ronald Reagan's transformation three decades later 
was not nearly as dramatic statistically as Eisenhower's, it was nev-
ertheless significant.tt7 Twice during his 1988 Moscow Summit, 
Reagan even found an opportunity to espouse his views on how de-
nying American presidents a third term "was an interference with 
the democratic rights of the [American] people."tts 
Eisenhower's efforts came to an abrupt conclusion when Soviet 
Premier Nikita Khrushchev used the U-2 incident to break up the 
Paris Summit Conference of May 1960. "His journeys in 1959 and 
1960 across Asia, Africa, and Latin America," however, "pushed 
relations with those regions" to the forefront of American foreign 
policy.tt9 At the same time, he bequeathed to John F. Kennedy 
situations in Cuba and Vietnam that led to grave crises in the 1960s. 
Reagan's gestures culminated in five meetings with Soviet 
leader Mikhail Gorbachev during the last three years of his presi-
dency. This was remarkable, considering that in his first four years 
in office, he had the distinction of being the first president since 
Franklin Roosevelt to go through a term without meeting a Soviet 
leader. Progress on many other foreign policy problems-the Mid-
dle East, Central America, and Southern Africa-remained elusive 
to the end. Ronald Reagan's most enduring legacy may well be that 
he turned the arms race around and brought us back from the brink 
of nuclear disaster. This assessment must, however, await the test 
of time. 
THE FUTURE OF THE AMENDMENT 
President Reagan may also be remembered sometime in the fu-
ture as the impetus behind the repeal of the twenty-second amend-
ment. One of his first pronouncements as a former president was a 
reiteration of his desire to fight for the repeal of what he charged 
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was "an infringement upon [our] democratic rights."12o 
Using an entirely different reasoning, Alexander Hamilton in 
Federalist No. 72, argued that placing a limit on the tenure of the 
president took away "one of the strongest incentives of human con-
duct"-the desire to be rewarded.t2t 
While most Americans today support the two-term tradition, 
they also consider it "too restrictive to be cemented into the Consti-
tution." Because there is no great groundswell for its repeal, proba-
bly only a national "emergency near the end of a popular 
president's second term might trigger a major repeal effort." Even 
then it would be extremely difficult to complete a successful repeal 
effort before the next election. Also the "repeal effort might run 
head on into an equally strong constitutional amendment drive to 
adopt the widely publicized single six-year presidential term." 122 
Thus we are left with what political scientist Clinton Rossiter called 
"a tainted amendment," one "based on the sharp anger of a mo-
ment rather than the studied wisdom of a generation." The Consti-
tution, Rossiter argued, is "not the place to engage in a display of 
rancor."t23 
Debate over the twenty-second amendment has brought two 
entirely different democratic traditions into conflict. One contends 
that placing a limit on presidential tenure constrains the will of the 
American people and is antidemocratic; the other argues it is more 
appropriate to support the notion that rotation in office is desirable 
and healthy. 
In 194 7, Congress determined that the infusion of new leader-
ship was the essence of democracy and rotation in office a principle 
bulwark of freedom. During the ensuing four years, forty-one state 
legislatures ratified that perspective. While many have since ques-
tioned the motives that produced the twenty-second amendment, no 
one in nearly four decades has been able to marshal support for a 
serious repeal effort. 
Americans have amended their Constitution but twenty-six 
times in two centuries. Only once, in 1933, has the United States 
been able to repeal a constitutional amendment. The Founding Fa-
thers meant for the process to be difficult, and it has been. When 
Congress repealed the Prohibition Amendment in 1933, the states 
were more eager to rescind it than they had been to approve it fif-
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teen years earlier. Unless there is a similar public upheaval, repeal 
of the twenty-second amendment appears unlikely in the foreseeable 
future. 
